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Price: Price: Antitrust--Market Necessity As a Defense to Price-Fixin

RECENT CASES

ANTITRUST-MARKET NECESSITY AS
A DEFENSE TO PRICE-FIXING
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP I
The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP) is an association of more than 24,000 writers and publishers of
musical compositions. 2 ASCAP's members have given the Society the
non-exclusive right 3 to license the public performance rights in their
copyrighted compositions to users of those works. 4 In effect ASCAP
operates as a clearinghouse for the licensing of most copyrighted com-

5
positions in the United States.
ASCAP employs several methods of licensing.6 The most prevalent
is the "blanket license." This license entitles the holder to perform for a
stated term any of the compositions in ASCAP's repertory. Compensation, regardless of the number of compositions actually used, is based on
a set fee or a percentage of the user's gross revenues. As a result of past
antitrust litigation concerning the blanket license, 7 ASCAP also is required to offer broadcasters a "per program" license and to permit direct licensing between its members and music users.8

1. 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
2. Garner, United States v. ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of the Amended
FinalJudgment of 1950, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 119 n.1 (1976).
3. AMERICAN Soc'Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS, ASCAP: THE
FACTS; AMERICAN SOC'Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS, ASCAP,
MUSIC AND THE LAW (uncirculated pamphlets).
4. Congress has given copyright owners the exclusive right to perform pub-

licly or to authorize the public performance of their copyrighted works.
Copyrights Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106-118 (West 1977). See also H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5676.
5. Garner, supra note 2, at 119 n.1.
6. CBS, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742,
743-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in
Music and Performance Right, Societies, in SEVEN COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED

69, 75-80 (Two-Volumes-in-One Ed. 1966).
7. United States v. ASCAP, [1940-41] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
56,104
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. ASCAP, [1950-51] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) [hereinafter cited as 1950 Amended Decree]. See also Comment, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable Compromise, 1959
DUKE L.J. 258.
8. The per program license provides blanket coverage of the ASCAP repertory, but the fee is based on the number of programs using ASCAP music.
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Practically, the blanket license is the sole method of licensing. 9 It
would be virtually impossible for users and individual copyright owners
to seek out the other to engage in direct licensing. 10 The copyright
owner could not detect infringements of his copyright; the user could
not practically protect himself from liability for infringment of
copyrights because of his need -for quick access to music and the impracticability of locating individual copyright owners. The nature of the
music industry suggests that a type of license giving blanket coverage of
the ASCAP repertory is necessary for some users.11
The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), a large user of ASCAP
music, has held a blanket license for its television network since the early
days of broadcasting. CBS sued ASCAP in 1969 and alleged violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.12 CBS claimed that the present
blanket licensing method constituted illegal price-fixing; that the existing
licensing alternatives forced it to pay for music it did not want in order
to obtain the music it desired (thus constituting an unlawful tying arrangement); and that the Society's members were guilty of attempted
monopolization and actual monopolization.' 3
An injunction was sought under section 16 of the Clayton Act 14 to
prohibit ASCAP from offering blanket licenses to any television network,
However, the amount of music used on a program remains irrelevant in the fee
calculation. The utility of the per program license is limited to "broadcasters
whose schedule consists predominantly of non-musical programming." CBS, Inc.
v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 134 n.9. (2d Cir. 1977). See 1950 Amended Decree, supra
note 7, §§ V(A), VII, IX.
9. CBS, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. Id. at 741; Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of MerchandisingModern Music:
The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 294, 297-98
(1954).
11. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP 562 F.2d 130, 136-38 (2d Cir. 1977); Timberg, supra
note 10, at 297.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. 1975) provides:
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ....
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or perons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
13. 400 F. Supp. at 745. Tying arrangements also are unlawful under § 3 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). However, § 3 applies only to leases or
sales of "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities...." Thus, any tying arrangement respecting musical copyrights would be
covered only by § 1 of the Sherman Act.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides that: "Any person, firm, corporation, or
association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of
the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .. "
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/7
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or alternatively to require ASCAP to15provide a form of "per use" license
to reflect CBS' actual use of music.
The district court viewed the allegation of an unlawful tying arrangement as the central issue in the case. It found that direct licensing
of individual copyrights was a feasible alternative to the blanket license
for CBS.1 6 Because CBS could seek competitive prices from individual
copyright owners, it was not compelled to take a blanket license. Due to
this absence of compulsion, the court held that ASCAP's blanket license
price-fixing, or
did not constitute an unlawful tying arrangement,
17
monopolization, and dismissed the complaint.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the feasibility of a
direct licensing alternative vitiated the allegations of a tying arrangement
and monopolization. However, the court held that the compulsion required for these violations is not an element of price-fixing,' 8 and therefore the feasibility of direct licensing did not override the adverse effect
on price competition caused by the set fee and royalty distribution formula under the blanket license. The Second Circuit thus held that the
present blanket license constituted illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act and reversed and remanded the case for proceedings on the
appropriate remedy.
The court distinguished but approved the result in a similar case
from the Ninth Circuit, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 19 in which
the parties and the Justice Department agreed that blanket licensing was
a "market necessity" in the music copyright licensing field for the single
radio station there involved.2 0 Because of the finding in CBS that direct
licensing was a feasible alternative for the CBS- network, the court concluded that market necessity was not a defense to the charge of pricefixing against ASCAP. However, the court suggested that the blanket
license served enough of a market need that it "need not be prohibited
in all circumstances."' 21 The court's recognition of the defense raises
questions about the current status of price-fixing and its appropriate
remedy under the antitrust laws.

15. 400 F. Supp. at 747 n.7.
16. Id. at 779.
17. Id. at 780-83. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
159 (1948) (compulsion and tying arrangements).
18. 562 F.2d at 138.
19. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968), noted in 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 230 (1968).
20. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 400, 401 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(denying ASCAP's motion for summary judgment) (stipulation of the K-91 parties); Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ
of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States at 10-11, K-91, Inc. v.
Gershwin Publ. Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045
(1968), quoted in CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP 337 F. Supp. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
21. 562 F.2d at 140.
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Antitrust analysis proceeds under one of two theories, the rule of
reason or the per se approach. 22 Both theories condemn contracts or
combinations which have as their purpose or effect the substantial reduction of competition in a given market. The major distinction lies in
the extent to which a court will analyze the circumstances surrounding a
particular practice and the justifications for that practice. If the main
purpose of a combination is legitimate, and its effects on competition are
adverse in some respects and beneficial in others, the court will employ
the rule of reason and examine the surrounding circumstances. The activity will be condemned only if a substantial and unreasonable negative
impact on competition is shown. 23 The per se theory provides that some
activities, despite their stated purpose, have such an inherently restrictive
effect on competition that once the activity is recognized, it is con24
demned without further analysis.
Price-fixing generally has been regarded as a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 5 Combinations having the purpose or substantial effect of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" the
price of a product have been held unlawful, without analysis of the possible benefits accruing from the arrangement or the reasonableness of

22. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing

and Market Division (pts. 1-2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966);
L.

SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST

§§ 63-72 (1977).

23. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Virginia Excelsior
Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Ref.
Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,
189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. American Smelting & Ref.
Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918).
24. The per se approach has been applied to a variety of anticompetitive activity. Price-fixing: United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Group Boycotts:
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941). Horizontal market division: United States v. Topco Assoc., 405
U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Vertical market division: Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960). Tying Arrangements: United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
25. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (setting maximum
prices); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/7
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the price. 26 The only analysis employed is one of characterization, i.e., a
determination whether the activity constitutes price-fixing. Where an ob27
vious design to set prices appears, this characterization is an easy task.
Where such a purpose is not so obvious, the court will look to the course
of conduct of the combination and the actual effect on prices in making
its determination. 8 The determinative element is whether price competition between the members of the combination has been eliminated or
29
restricted.
ASCAP's present blanket license "involves the fixing of a collective
price." 30 ASCAP receives a single royalty from each licensee which is
distributed among the members according to a schedule prepared by the

Society.3 1 The court in CBS found that the mere existence of blanket

licensing "dulled the incentive" of ASCAP's members to compete in set-

ting individual prices and to engage in direct licensing.3 2 This restriction of competition dictated a finding of price-fixing under the per se
rule.
Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, 33 courts have permitted

some arrangements despite their effect on prices. If the challenged conduct is merely "ancillary to a transaction which is itself legitimate," this
doctrine may take the case out of the per se approach and justify application of the rule of reason.3 4 Although the doctrine originally was confined to cases in which a covenant restricting competition was necessary
to protect one of the parties, 35 it has undergone expansion. It now permits "business arrangements of benefit to the parties, and perhaps to the
36
public, which have no injurious effect in the sense of antitrust policy."
26. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
27. Id.; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
28. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
29. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940).
30. 562 F.2d at 139.
31. Id. at 135-36. Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 75-80.
32. 562 F.2d at 139.
33. Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Sound Ship
Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 387 Supp. 252 (D.NJ. 1975), aff'd on other
grounds, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1977); United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Walt Disney Prod. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 113
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), affd in part, 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (equally divided court).
34. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
35. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir.
1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
36. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,'178
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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To qualify for removal from per se treatment, the restraint (1) must be
"reasonably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the arrangement, and of no broader scope than reasonably necessary," (2) it must
not "unreasonably affect competition in the marketplace," and (3) it
must not be "imposed by a party or parties with monopoly power." 3 7 In
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.38 an agreement between a major
motion picture producer and a subsidiary of one of its main competitors
provided for joint formulation of sales policy and minimum rate
schedules. This agreement was upheld against price-fixing attacks. The
court found the challenged clauses necessary but ancillary to the legitimate business purposes of the parties. 39 The court noted that the company had relatively slight power in a heavily competitive industry, and
added that there was no evidence that prices were ultimately affected.4 0
Similarly, trademark licensing agreements containing price restrictions
41
have been upheld under the doctrine.
At first blush, blanket licensing appears to involve an ancillary restraint. The purposes of the combination-to establish an effective market for copyright licensing and to provide copyright owners with an effective infringement detection system-are clearly legitimate. However,
it is questionable whether the price restraints of a fee set by ASCAP are
inextricable from the advantages of the integration of licensing functions. A blanket coverage license with rates for individual compositions
set by each copyright owner could service the same needs without stifling
competition; price-fixing is not essential to the working of the licensing
system in CBS' case. 42 Additionally, considering the pervasive role of
ASCAP in the licensing field, it can hardly be contended that the effect
of the present blanket license on price competition is not substantial. It is
settled law that a valid purpose alone will not save an unlawful pricefixing scheme. 43 The blanket license is not valid as an ancillary restraint
because price-fixing is not necessary to the legitimate purpose of the
combination and th restraint does substantially affect competition in the

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 178-79.
40. Id. at 178-81. Cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961) (under a very broad definition of the relevant market, the Court found
that a 20-year requirements contract did not substantially lessen competition).
41. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.
1962); Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 544
F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
42. See text accompanying note 62 infra. Cf United States v. Line Materials
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310-15 (1948) (patent pooling).
43. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940);
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930); United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923). Cf Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/7
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marketplace. Therefore, the court in CBS was correct in deciding the
case via the per se approach.
However, the court backed away from settled per se law in its recommendation of the appropriate remedy. Once price-fixing is established, the usual remedy is an injunction prohibiting the unlawful activity.4 4 The CBS court declined to suggest a ban on the blanket licensing
method. Rather it proposed a requirement that ASCAP offer an alternate form of blanket coverage license with compensation based on actual
use of music (a "per use" license) in addition to the present blanket
license. 45 Thus, it appears the court would permit the continued use of
a method it has found to constitute price-fixing.
Apparently the basis for the court's stance is its newly-coined "market necessity" defense to price-fixing. 46 In essence the market necessity
defense states that a combination, the purpose of which is to provide a
workable marketplace for its members' products but which inevitably restricts competition among members, can be justified nonetheless as the
only viable way to market the product. The distinction between ancillary
restraints and market necessity is basically one of characterization. An
activity which affects prices may be found lawful as an ancillary restraint,
thus avoiding characterization as price-fixing. However, market necessity
may permit the continuation of an activity even after it has been found to
constitute price-fixing under the per se rule.
In K-91 the parties stipulated that, for almost all broadcasters, it
would be "commercially impossible" to acquire a separate license for
each performance. 47 The Solicitor General agreed that "[i]f this market
is to function at all, there must be-at least with respect to licensing the
performance of recorded music-some kind of central licensing agency
by which copyright holders may offer their works in a common pool to
48
all who wish to use them."
Thus, the market necessity of some type of blanket license has been
previously recognized, although no court has openly relied on the defense. The court in CBS touched on market necessity in connection with
its discussion of the appropriate remedy. The court noted that absence

44. 562 F.2d at 140.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 136, 140. The opinion is unclear as to the exact role of market
necessity in the case. Although market necessity was found not to constitute a
complete defense for price-fixing, the court noted that "market need" may support a remedy that stops short of an outright ban on the present blanket license.
47. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying
ASCAP's motion for summary judgment) (stipulation of the K-91 parties).
48. 562 F.2d at 137 n.20 (quoting Memorandum of the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States at 10-11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ. Co., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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of a "market need" for the blanket license had not been shown. 41 It
conceded that a blanket license might be desirable for some large users
even if direct licensing were feasible. 50 With this in mind, the court
indicated that the blanket licensing practice could continue if some alternative license were made available.
However, market necessity will not support even this partial toleration of the present blanket license. First, the proposed remedy still may
amount to unlawful price-fixing. The court reasoned that a per use
licensing system is feasible for CBS, but it failed to specify the method of
pricing under such a system. CBS's proposal for a per use system,
referred to by the district court, would provide blanket coverage of the
ASCAP repertory with a fee specified for each performance of a composition from the pool. 51 The objectionable aspect of this proposal is
that fees for individual compositions would be set according to a
schedule prepared by ASCAP and based on the nature and duration of
the use and the popularity of the composition.5 2 A per use fee schedule
set by ASCAP's administration is no less a price-fixing agreement than
the present blanket fee.
The CBS proposal also provides for determination of the fee
schedule by a court if ASCAP and the user are unable to agree on a
price. 53

However, the court noted in deciding another issue 54 that a

reasonable fee set by a court is no more a truly competitive system than
an agreement between competitors to set a price. 55 Therefore, if the
court was referring to the CBS proposal in its recommendation of an
alternate per use system, it is difficult to find any real improvement in
the nature of the pricing arrangement over the present blanket license.
If the court was referring to a per use system in which the copyright
holders themselves set licensing fees, the result would be a definite enhancement of competition. However, such a proposal illuminates the
second problem with the court's analysis of market necessity. If such a
per use system is workable, 56 there appears to be no reason why the
49. 562 F.2d at 140.
50. Id.

51. 400 F. Supp. at 747 n.7.
52. Id.
53. Id.

54. Under the 1950 Amended Decree, supra note 7, § IX, ASCAP or a user
could petition the District Court for the Southern District of New York for a
determination of a reasonable license fee in the event the parties could not
agree. ASCAP claimed in CBS that this provision insulated the Society from a
finding of price-fixing.
55. 562 F.2d at 138-39. The correctness of this view is placed in doubt by the
existence of several patent cases which have allowed determination of "reasonable royalties" by a court as a method of correcting price-fixing violations. See
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 93-94 (1950); United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 334-37 (1947).
56. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/7
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present blanket license should not be banned and a strictly per use system instituted for users like CBS. The court's problem is its failure to
distinguish clearly between the recognized market necessity for blanket
coverage of a license 57 and non-necessary package pricing. A per use
license with only blanket coverage of the ASCAP repertory would serve
the legitimate interests of providing a functional licensing market and
centralized infringement protection without the unsavory aspect of
price-fixing. In this respect the court is unpersuasive in stating that, as to
CBS, there is a market need or necessity for a blanket license with a
price-fixing feature. Market necessity only justifies blanket licensing in
this case, not blanket pricing.
Users with different characteristics than CBS present stronger arguments for the market necessity of a blanket license with package pricing. The performance rights to copyrighted compositions must be
licensed for all "public performances" of these works. 58 Across the
country there are countless small users (individual radio stations, movie
theatres, concert halls, taverns with live music, university concert series,
and even baseball parks) which currently are licensed by ASCAP. 5 9 A
per use license in these situations would involve numerous problems of
administration and policing. For example the tavern owner under a per
use license would be required to log and report for royalties purposes
every composition played in his club; ASCAP would need a "spotter"
constantly in attendance to ensure complete reporting. In many cases the
administrative costs of reporting and policing such a system might be as
great as the present blanket license fee.60 The impossibility of policing
every user in a per use world would make the monopoly of the individual composer's copyright largely illusory. Both the blanket coverage
and the package pricing of the present blanket license may be a neces61
sary evil for some areas of music copyright licensing.
Considerations of administration and policing do not support the
market necessity of package pricing for CBS. CBS currently provides
ASCAP with logs of its use of music. The logs are used in distributing
57. See generally authorities cited note 11 supra.
58. Copyrights Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106-118 (West 1977). See also
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 63, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5676.
59. Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 77.
60. Current blanket fees for small taverns and nightclubs run from $90 to
$570 per year, depending on the amount and type of music provided. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, General License AgreementRestaurants, Taverns, Nightclubs, and Similar Establishments (ASCAP form
contract) 3.
61. The CBS court noted that licensing of musical performing rights presents
problems that are sui generis in both copyright and antitrust law. 562 F.2d at
132. The court recognized that it would be "difficult even to imagine another
industry where such a 'market necessity' defense would be applicable." Id. at 138
n.22.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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royalties among the Society's members. 62 Because CBS already is required to maintain such a reporting system, the additional costs of complete reporting under a per use system presumably would not significandy burden the network.
The unanswered question is how far the market necessity defense
should extend. In other words, when will market necessity justify blanket
licensing and package pricing? For example reporting and enforcement
problems would be less significant for the limited number of programs
in a university concert series than for the constantly changing music in a
tavern or theatre. However, the differences between a large radio station
and the CBS television network would not be as significant. No clear
standard is apparent of the amount of burden either on the user or on
ASCAP that would be sufficient to invoke the defense. Indeed, the policy of the antitrust laws against price-fixing is strong, and it is debatable
whether factors such as burdensome administrative costs even should be
considered as a defense. 63 Market necessity is a totally new exception to
the prevailing view of price-fixing. In light of the impressive precedent
supporting the per se theory, if the defense is to be, applied at all, it
should be strictly scrutinized and contained. Especially in cases like CBS
where a viable method of doing business under fully competitive circumstances exists, the courts should adhere to the Sherman Act's mandate of open competition in the marketplace.
JOHN E. Piuca

62. Telephone interview with Richard H. Reimer, Counsel for ASCAP, New
York (March 16, 1978).
63. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940);
cases cited note 25 supra.
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